Allegation 07 Illustrated -
16th Amendment Judicial Subversion

The 16th Amendment's self-evident, simple, indisputable language

(“… power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, …")

unquestionably dictates a DIRECT tax on "incomes".

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THIS COURT overruled these simple words,

drastically manipulating its type of taxation from DIRECT to INDIRECT,

the only other Constitutional category:

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“... simply prohibited the income tax

 from being taken out of the category

of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged…”

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 US 103 (1916)

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“… it is clearly established

that since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment,

AN INCOME TAX IS NEVER A DIRECT TAX.

The effect of that change [the 16th Amendment] in the Constitution was to take a tax upon income derived from sources which had therefore made it a direct tax, out of that category, and put it in the class of excises, duties, and imposts.”

Cook v. Tait, Collector of Internal Revenue,

286 Fed. 409, at 412 (D.C. Md. 1923) (citations omitted),

ff’d 265 US 47, 44 S. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895 (1924)

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“The tax is, of course, an excise tax, as are all taxes on income”

White Packing Company v. Robertson,

89 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1937)

 

 “Income taxes are classified as … indirect taxes …”

Apache Bend Apts. Ltd., v. United States,

702 F. Supp. 1285, 295 (n.D. Tex. 1988)

 

“… for constitutional purposes, the income tax is an excise tax. …”

United States v. Gaumer,

972 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1992)

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THIS COURT's previously detailed multiple Case Law citations

changing SUBJECT MATTER from persons or objects (direct)

to activities (indirect)

document a category reversal,

a drastic rewrite exactly opposite the self-evident meaning

within the Legislative Defendants’ 30 words;

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thereby an unconstitutional Judicial re-legislation;

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and thereby a Judicial Breach of Legislative Duty:

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16A Am. Jur. 2d § 174: “A court cannot make unconstitutional provisions constitutional by forced constructions, or by regarding form rather than substance;

a statute is constitutional or unconstitutional

by reason of its scope and purpose and effect,

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and it is tested by a realistic consideration of

the subject which it encompasses,

the purpose which it seeks to serve,

and the effect it will have when put in operation.

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If there is no way of harmonizing a statute with the constitution, the statute must fall.

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Where the language used in a statute is plain,

the court cannot read words into it that are not found therein

either expressly or by fair implication,

even to save its constitutionality,

because this would be legislation, and not construction;

and the court cannot arbitrarily disregard language used by the legislature."

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16A Am. Jur. 2d § 176: “The duty of the courts to construe a statute so as to save its constitutionality when it is reasonably susceptible of two constructions includes the duty of adopting a construction that will not subject it to a succession of doubts as to its constitutionality, for it is well settled that a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave or serious doubt upon that score. …”

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16A Am Jur 2d Sec 270: "... the judiciary may not encroach upon the functions of the legislature or usurp its powers ... Thus, courts cannot, by an act of judicial legislation, add words of limitation to a statute expressed in general terms in order to sustain it, where its operation on the subject matter embraced in its terms is unconstitutional."